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THE VIRGINIA UNINSURED MOTORIST
LAW: ITS INTENT AND PURPOSE
Until quite recently, there was a great uncertainty in Virginia as to
the legality of the so-called "other insurance" clauses which many in-
surance companies inserted in uninsured motorist endorsements as a
matter of course. These clauses were generally held by the federal
courts to be enforceable, and, in the. process, were claimed to be com-
patible with the statutory provisions of the Virginia uninsured motorist
law.' Then in 1965, the Supreme Court of Appeals, in Bryant v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,2 struck down these clauses on the ground
that they were contrary to the intent and purpose of the Virginia unin-
sured motorist statute. In order to thoroughly ferret out the reasoning
behind the Bryant decision, one must determine the true purpose of the
uninsured motorist law; therefore, it is necessary to examine not only
decisions concerned directly with the "other insurance" clause, but also
this state's uninsured motorist laws in general.
Although the Virginia uninsured motorist statute is of relatively recent
origin, a number of court decisions have proceeded rapidly to form a
solid assemblage of judicial interpretations from which may be derived
the specific rules and principles that today comprise the uninsured motor-
ist law in this state. While no attempt will be made to solve or to dis-
cuss all the problems that may possibly arise under this law, it is hoped
that specific principles can be stated and that certain conclusions can be
drawn which will enable both the layman and the lawyer to better un-
derstand the reasons for the result reached in the Bryant decision and
related cases.
THE FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE MOTORIST AND THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE
In order to fully comprehend the value of Virginia's uninsured motor-
ist legislation, one must realize the great need that exists for protection
against the financially irresponsible motorist. The financially irrespon-
sible driver is, of course, a person who is either without funds or whose
funds are, for one reason or another, not available in sufficient amount
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be rendered against him.
For practical purposes, the term "financially irresponsible motorist" usu-
1. Travelers Inden. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963), reversing 209 F.Supp.
784 (WD. Va. 1962).
2. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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ally includes hit and run drivers, those driving stolen vehicles, unin-
sured motorists, and those driving automobiles upon which the insur-
ance company denies coverage. By what means are members of soci-
ety to be protected against suffering injuries, crippling, and property.
losses caused by such a motorist? Certainly, justice cannot be served
if the injured party wins his case in court against. the negligent driver
only to discover that the wrongdoer is unable to pay the damages.3
As a result of the public concern over the myriad of problems aris-
ing from bodily injuries and property damages negligently inflicted by
automobile drivers who are financially irresponsible or uninsured, the
Virginia uninsured motorist statute was enacted.4 This type of statute,
by far the most successful of the four main types of statutes in. the
United States aimed at this problem,5 operates directly on the insurance
within the state contain a special clause protecting the insured against
companies by requiring that every automolbile liability policy written
bodily injury or property damages suffered at the hands of an uninsured
motorist." The purpose of requiring such a clause is to give the insured
3. See Comment, The Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A Survey of State Legisla-
tion, 10 VILL. L. REV. 545 (1965).
4. "The intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Uninsured Motorist Act
was to provide benefits and protection against the peril of injury by an uninsured
motorist to an insured motorist, his family, and the permissive users of his vehicle:'
Annot., S.C. CODE § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1964). The South Carolina law is modeled after
the Virginia statute. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co, 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
For a brief history of the Virginia uninsured motorist statute, see Court, Virginia's
Experience 'with the "Uninsured Motorist Act", 3 W. & M. L. REv. 237 (1962).
5. The other three types are: (1) statutes which make it compulsory that every
vehicle registered in the state have liability insurance, that is, it must be covered by
a policy of insurance which indemnifies against liability on account of injuries or
property damage inflicted by the insured on another; (2) unsatisfied judgment fund
statutes, which provide for the establishment of a fund for the victims of accidents
involving financially irresponsible drivers; and, (3) financial responsibility statutes, by
far the most popular type, which are brought into action and impose sanctions and/or
penalties only after the judgment has been handed down or, at the earliest, only after the
accident has occurred.
For criticisms of these various legislative enactments, see 10 VIL. L. REv., supra note 3.
For a discussion of the inadequacies of the financial responsibility statute, see VA. AD-
VISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCaL, Report of Nov. 4, 1957, to Hon. Thomas B. Stanley,
Governor of Va., and the General Assenbly of Va.
6. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1964).
The uninsured motorist law of Virginia is presently found in three principal parts
in three separate titles of the Virginia Code of 1950. Code sections 12-65 through 12-67,
the first part, creates the uninsured motorist fund and specifies how it is to be ad-
ministered. Section 38.1-381, the heart of Virginia's uninsured motorist law, sets forth
specific mandatory provisions which every automobile liability policy issued in this
state must contain. The third part, found in sections 46.1-167.1 through 46.1-167.6,
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who has been injured by an uninsured motorist the same protection
he would have had if he had been injured by a driver covered by lia-
bility insurance. 7 In short, the statute intends to relieve insured drivers,
to a certain extent, of the risk of injury or damage resulting from the
negligent conduct of financially irresponsible uninsured persons.s And,
as this statute was enacted for the benefit of the injured parties, it is to
be liberally construed so that the purpose intended may be realized.0
By the force of § 38.1-381(b), the Virginia uninsured motorist stat-
ute becomes as much a part of every automobile liability policy issued
in this state as if it were expressly included therein and the insur-
ance company is bound to pay the insured all sums to which he may
become legally entitled to recover as damages from an uninsured motor-
ist.'0 Specifically, § 38.1-381(b) provides that no automobile liability
policy shall be issued or delivered in Virginia unless it contains an unin-
sured motorist endorsement which undertakes to "pay the insured all
sums which he shall legally be entitled to recover as damages from the
owner or operator of an insured motor vehicle . . ." within the
limits of Code § 46.1-1(8) ($15,000 for injury or death to any one
person; $30,000 for injury or death of two or more persons in any
one accident; and, $5,000 for damage to or destruction of property
in any one accident).
The operation of Virginia's uninsured motorist law is not confined
to accidents occurring within this state; the insurance company's obliga-
tion exists even where the insured has an accident in another state which
has no uninsured motorist law. For example, in Hodgson v. Doe," an
insured Virginian was injured in Tennessee when her automobile was
allegedly forced off the road by an unidentified motorist. The Virginia
court, in holding the insurance company liable for her damages, noted:
The endorsement required by § 38.1-381(b) on a plaintiff's insurance
provides for the annual collection of a $20.00 fee for each uinsured automobile regis-
tered with the Division of Motor Vehicles. See Yellow Cab Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.
Adinolfi, 204 Va. 815, 134 S.E.2d 308 (1964).
7. Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co, 342 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965); see
7 Am. JUR.2D AuTo. INs. S 135 (1963).
8. Motors Ins. Co. v. Surety Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 487, 134 S.E.2d 631 (1965).
9. Byrant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
10. Hodgson v. John Doe, 203 Va. 938, 128 S.E.2d 444 (1962); Mangus v. John Doe,
203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 203 Va.
440, 125 S.E.2d 154 (1962).
11. 203 Va. 938, 128 S.E.2d 444 (1962).
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policy has no territorial limitation, but binds the insurance company
to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover
as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
... To limit the coverage of the endorsement to accidents happening
in Virginia would be to create a limitation which the statute does not
contain. The endorsement is the contract which the insurance company
makes with the insured to protect him against the uninsured motorist.
It is a protection for which the insured has paid an additional premium
and it follows the insured to the place of the accident outside of Vir-
ginia, just as the usual indemnity and collision provisions of an auto-
mobile insurance policy follow the car and protect the operator
wherever the accident may occur.12
An interesting situation has arisen concerning the specified limits
placed on the liability of the insurance companies offering uninsured
motorist coverage. Remembering that recovery only up to $30,000 niay
be had for injury or death to two or more persons involved in any
one accident; what happens, for instance, when the insured persons, rid-
ing in their automobile, are simultaneously struck by two uninsured
motorists and suffer injuries to the extent of $60,000? Are the injured
plaintiffs allowed to recover $60,000 from the insurance company, the
aggregate amount for two accidents, or $30,000, the limit recoverable
for one accident? Under such circumstances, both the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals' 3 and the federal courts14 have held that only
one accident occurred and therefore the applicable limit was $30,000.
The United States District Court noted that ". . . the effect of the
uninsured motorist law is not to provide coverage upon each and every
uninsured vehicle, but upon the insured motorist .... [Emphasis added.]
Assuming this view of the purpose and effect of the law to be sound,
[there is] ... no reason why the insurer may not limit his coverage,
the limit of course to be not less than that required by the statute." 15
The argument that the statute does not provide insurance coverage
for the benefit of the uninsured motorist is also applied in those cases
which refuse to allow a joint-tortfeasor's insurance company to obtain
contribution from the injured insured's insurance company. In Southern
v., Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,' 6 plaintiff was injured while an occupant
12. Id. 203 Va. at 942, 128 S.E.2d at 447.
13. Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 204 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963).
14. State Farm Mur. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, 191 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Va. 1961)
aff'd, 316 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1963).
15. id. 191 F. Supp. at 860.
16. 236 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Va. 1964).
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in an automobile. She sued her uninsured driver, her own insurance
company under its uninsured motorist endorsement, and the other
driver's insurance company. The court granted summary judgment
against the other driver's insurance company and required it to pay
plaintiff her full damages. The other driver's insurance company con-
tended that since the other joint-tortfeasor (plaintiff's driver) was un-
insured, this brought the plaintiff's own uninsured motorist endorse-
ment into play and her insurance company should therefore contribute
toward paying the damages. In rejecting this contention, the federal
court held that since the uninsured motorist law did not provide insur-
ance for the uninsured motorist but only protection for the injured
insured motorist against inadequate compensation, the injured party's
insurance company would not be forced to contribute. The court
stated that the other driver's insurance company could, however, obtain
contribution from the uninsured motorist himself.17
As to the question of whether or not uninsured motorist coverage
provides for the payment of punitive damages to its insured who is in-
volved in an automobile accident with an uninsured driver, if one
adheres to the stated purposes of the statutory provisions and the
reasoning of the above cases, the answer to such a question must surely
be "no." A recent South Carolina decision,' following an uninsured
motorist statute modeled after Virginia's, concluded that the statute
did not provide for the payment of punitive damages. Later that same
year, however, the South Carolina statute was amended so as to include
within the term "damages," both actual and punitive damages.19 Such
an amendment, or one similar to it, would be required before punitive
damages could be awarded under the present Virginia uninsured motor-
ist act.
COVERAGE OF THE NAMED INSURED, SPECIFIED RELATIVES,
PERMITTEES, AND GuEs-rs
Before an injured person can claim the benefits of uninsured motorist
coverage in Virginia he must meet two requirements. First, such a
person must be involved in an accident with an uninsured motor ve-
17. Accord, Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co, 212 F. Supp. 349, 352 (W.D. Va.
1962), wherein the court reasoned as follows: "If [the insurance company] . . . is not
an insurer of [the uninsured motorist] . . ., as we have seen it is not, what then in the
nature of the insurance company's relationship to [the uninsured driver] ... ? It would
seem that the delineation of contingent surety would be closer to the mark."
18. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co, 234 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
19. S.C. COPa ANN. S 46-750.31 (Supp. 1964).
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hicle; and, secondly, such person must qualify as an "insured". 0 Code
section 38.1-381 (c) specifically states that the term "insured" includes
the following persons:
... the named insured and, while resident of the same household,
the spouse of any such named insured, the relatives of either, while in a
motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses, with the con-
sent, express or implied, or the named insured, the motor vehicle to
which the policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle... 21
The named insured refers, of course, to the person named in the
policy.22 Also considered insured is the spouse of the named insured, so
long as he or she resides in the named insured's household.2 Included in
the category of "insured" are the relatives of either the named insured
or his spouse who reside in the named insured's household and who do
not own their own car.24 As the uninsured motorist statute is to be lib-
erally construed in favor of the injured parties, it is reasonable to believe
that relatives by affinity are also considered to be insiured if they meet
the other requirements. 25 Like the spouse, however, once the relatives
cease residing in the household, they are no longer considered insured
under the policy.26
The named insured, the spouse, and their relatives, comprise what is
commonly known in uninsured motorist law as the "first class" of in-
sured persons.2 7 A member of this.class is protected twenty-four hours
a day against the uninsured motorist, not only while using or occupying
the insured vehicle and other vehicles, but also while a pedestrian. 2 For
20. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co, 203 Va. 600, 126 S.E.2d
840 (1962).
21. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(c) (Supp. 1964).
22. See Fargrave & Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 31 INs. COuNSEL J. 665
(1964).
23. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 244 S.C. 559, 137 S.E.2d 769 (1964).
24. Uninsured motorist clauses generally exclude from coverage any automobiles
owned by relatives, or spouse, of the named insured. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Smith, - Va. -, 142 S.E.2d 562 (1965).
25. See Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 145, 156 (1961).
26. But cf. Appleton v. Merchants Ins. Co, 16 App. Div.2d 361, 228 N.YS.2d 442
(1962), wherein the insured's stepson was held entitled to claim benefits under unin-
sured motorist coverage because of an automobile accident which happened in Hawaii
where the stepson was on military duty.
27. Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
28. Ibid.; see Richardson & Doar, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law, 15
S.C.L.Q. 739, 741 (1963).
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example, in Palletti v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., the
wife was the named insured and her husband, while on foot, was injured
by a negligent uninsured motorist. The husband successfully recovered
his damages against the insurance company under the uninsured motor-
ist coverage issued to his wife.3°
The second class of insured persons contemplated by the uninsured
motorist statute are permittees, that is, those who use, "with the consent,
express or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which
the policy applies" - and those who are guests in such a vehicle. Per-
mittees and guests, unlike persons of the first class, are covered by
uninsured motorists benefits only while actually occupying, entering, or
alighting from the insured car. To illustrate, in Insurance Co. of North
America v. Perry,3 2 a policeman, in the performance of his duties, parked
a city-owned police vehicle and walked some distance away. While
walking, he was struck and killed by an uninsured motor vehicle. The
deceased policeman's administrator asserted that the accident was cov-
ered under the uninsured motorist clause of the city's automobile liability
policy. In striking down this assertion and in holding the police
officer not covered by the policy, the court commented:
IT]he legislature, in enacting the uninsured motorist statute, in-
tended to create two classes of insured persons, with different benefits
accruing to each class. . . . [I]t is of crucial importance to note that
while the legislature provided for coverage to the named insured and
the specified members of his household, 'while in a motor vehicle or
otherwise,' it expressly omitted the use of this language with relation to
one 'who uses' the vehicle with permission .... It is our opinion that,
as to a permissive user of an insured vehicle, the legislature intended
. . . to provide protection only against an injury which occurs to one
while using such vehicle.a3
The obvious intent of § 38.1-381 (c) is to provide uninsured motorist
coverage to permissive users in the same manner that § 38.1-381(a),
the "omnibus clause," provides liability coverage to such persons. Both
29. 16 App. Div.2d 814, 228 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1962).
30. Accord, Matwijko v. Walter Zolady Lumber Builders Supply & Fuel Corp., 16
App. Div.2d 1024, 203 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1964), a case in which an infant, also on foot, was
injured by an uninsured motorist and was allowed to recover under his father's unin-
sured motorist coverage.
31. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381 (c) (Supp. 1964).
32. 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
33. Id. 204 Va. at 836-838.
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of these statutory provisions are aimed toward providing coverage
to persons using the insured vehicle with the named insured's permission
even though these people knew absolutely nothing about the owner's in-
surance policy. Under both the "omnibus clause" and the uninsured
motorist statute, the determination of whether or not permission was
given in a specific case must, of course, be decided upon the particular
facts of that situation. The Virginia courts generally show a tendency
to find "implied" permission when it would be to the advantage of the
injured party and when there are enough facts upon which such a
finding can be reasonably supported.34
In order for a guest occupant in an automobile to qualify as an insured,
such person must not only be in the vehicle to which the policy applies,
but the vehicle must be in use by the named insured, one of the speci-
fied relatives, or a person who uses the car with the express or implied
consent of the named insured.35 For example, if an insured's daughter
allows the insured vehicle to be driven by a friend without the in-
sured's consent, and a guest in the vehicle is injured, then the guest is not
covered under the uninsured motorist endorsement because of the lack
of consent. The uninsured motorist statute was enacted to provide
insurance coverage only to those persons specified in the statute and
does not provide coverage to everyone.3 6
THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE
An "uninsured automobile," as defined by Code subsection 38.1-381
(c) (i), is first of all a motor vehicle on which there is absolutely no
liability insurance.3 7 In addition, the above term includes a motor vehicle
which has some liability insurance, but the limits of which are less than
the amounts specified by § 46.1-1 (8). For example, if an automobile
34. "In defining 'implied permission', and applying it to the facts of the many cases
we have had, this court has been liberal in its interpretation and application, and has
gone far in holding insurance carriers liable.' Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Harlow, 191 Va.
64, 69, 59 S.E.2d 872 (1950).
Virginia follows what is commonly referred to as the "minor deviation" rule, that
is, it holds that once the user obtains original permission he is an insured until he
deviates grossly from that permission. Conversely, if the use made of the vehicle is
not a gross violation of the permission given, even though it amounted to a deviation,
insurance coverage is still afforded the user. See, e.g., Sordelett v. Mercer, 185 Va. 823, 40
S.E.2d 289 (1946).
35. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co, 203 Va. 600, 125 S.E.2d
840 (1962).
36. Id. 203 Va. at 603.
37. See generally 7 AM. JUR2D Auro. INs. S 136 (1963).
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has liability policy limits of only $7,500 (one person), $15,000 (one
accident), and $2,500 (property loss), the car would be considered
"uninsured" according to the statutory command since Virginia re-
quires limits of $15,000, $30,000, and $ 5 , 0 00.3s It is important to note,
however, that the automobile is uninsured only to the extent that its own
liability limits do not meet the statutory limits. Thus, the vehicle with
the $7,500-$15,000-$2,500 limits would be uninsured only to the extent
that the injured person's claim exceeded those limits29
Secondly, by §§ 38.1-381(c) (ii), the definition of uninsured auto-
mobile includes a motor vehicle which has sufficient insurance "but
the insurance company writing the same denies coverage thereunder.
."..,40 In order to recognize and appreciate the value of such a statutory
provision, one need only look to the inequitable results reached in those
jurisdictions which have no such provision. In New York, the unin-
sured motorist coverage is held to apply only where the automobile
involved in an accident is "uninsured" in the strict sense of the word.
Thus, where the insurance company of the driver causing the accident
denied liability because of its insured's non-co-operation, this was held
not to change the fact that the negligent driver's automobile was an
insured vehicle at the time of the collision.4 Similarly, it has been held
that an automobile which was insured at the time of the accident
was not an uninsured motor vehicle where the insurance carrier became
insolvent after the accident and became unable to satisfy claims.42
Under the Virginia statute, such unfortunate results as those reached
in the above decisions are not possible. In McDaniel v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.,43 it was decided that a motor vehicle was an "uninsured
automobile" within the meaning of the statute where the insurance com-
38. See Fargrave & Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 665,
667 (1964).
39. Ibid.
40. VA CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(c) (ii) (Supp. 1964).
41. Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 257 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App.Div. 1965); accord, Ber-
man v. Travelers Indem. Co., 11 Misc.2d 291, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1958).
In McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 16 App. Div.2d 35, 224
N.Y.S.2d 909, aff'd 12 N.Y.S.2d 922, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101, 188 N.E.2d 405 (1963), the
insured intentionally drove his car into another automobile and his insurance company
denied liability on the ground that the assaulted person's injuries were not the result
of an "accident". This denial of liability was held to have no effect on the fact that the
assaulter's car was insured within the meaning of the New York statute.
42. Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964);
accord, Uline v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp., 28 Misc.2d 1002, 213
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1961).
43. 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d 806 (1965).
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pany denied liability on the ground of non-co-operation though it did
not deny liability until after the action was already commenced against
its alleged insured. To hold otherwise ".... would place a difficult, if
not impossible, burden on the plaintiff to require him to ascertain in
advance of bringing his suit that the insurance company which had is-
sued a liability policy to the defendant had denied coverage there-
under." 44 Such a fair result is certainly in keeping with the avowed
purpose of the Virginia uninsured motorist act-which is to insure justice
to the injured party.
Also embraced within the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle"
is the automobile whose owner or operator is "unknown".45 The pur-
pose of this inclusion is to meet the problems caused by the hit and run
automobile-not only the usual hit and run of a pedestrian, but also
accidents between two or more automobiles, one of whose drivers is,
for one reason or another, "unknown". The problem of bringing suit
against one's insurance company when injured by an unknown driver
was considered in Mangus v. John Doe.46 In that case, plaintiff alleged
that while he was stopped at a traffic signal, an automobile driven by
an unknown person struck his automobile from the rear. The plaintiff
and the driver of the other car then got out of their vehicles to inspect
for any damages, but the plaintiff did not obtain the other driver's name
or license number. No report of this accident was made to the insurance
company or to the police until four months later, when it became ap-
parent that the plaintiff had suffered injuries. The court held that the
uninsured motorist law gave plaintiff a right of recovery when injured
44. Id. 139 S.E.2d at 809.
S.C. CoDF ANN. §§ 46-750.31(3)(b) (Supp. 1964) defines an "uninsured motor
vehicle" as meaning an automobile as to which "there is nominally . . . insurance, but
the insurance carrier writing the same successfully denies coverage thereunder. . .
By virtue of S.C. CoDE ANN. §S 46-750.31 (3) (c) (Supp. 1964), an automobile is also
considered uninsured if "there was ... insurance, but the insurance carrier who wrote
the same is declared insolvent, or is in delinquency proceedings, suspension, or receiver-
ship, or is proven unable to fully respond to a judgment.. .. " In North River Ins. Co.
v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964), the receiver of an insolvent insurance
company was held to have effectively "denied coverage" within the purview of the
statute by notifying the defendant that the company lacked sufficient funds to continue
defense of the tort action brought by the plaintiff; hence, the insurance company of the
plaintiff was liable under its uninsured motorist endorsement. The same result has been
reached under the Virginia act even though such statute is not quite so detailed and
specific as that of South Carolina. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va.
887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
45. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(c) (Supp. 1964).
46. 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
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by an unknown motorist and that this right could not be qualified by
requiring him to ascertain the identity of the other driver.
We recognize that this interpretation could open the door to the
filing of fraudulent claims but persons who have valid causes of action
should not be denied the right to recover because of the possibility
of the presentation of fraudulent claims by others. If fraudulent claims
do arise they may be ferreted out in the same manner in which courts
and juries handle such situations in other cases.47
A motor vehicle whose owner has qualified as a self-insurer is not,
under the Virginia statute, considered to be an uninsured motor ve-
hicle.48 "The effect.., is to exclude from the uninsured motorist cover-
age the damages caused by the negligence of an operator of the motor
vehicle of a self-insured .... , In Yellow Cab Co. of Virginia, Inc. v.
Adinolfi, 0 the driver of a cab was involved in an accident with an unin-
sured driver. Having obtained a judgment against the uninsured motor-
ist, the cab driver sued his employer (the cab company) which was
a self-insurer. The cab company's defense that the Virginia statutes
do not require a self-insurer to provide uninsured motorist protection
was held well taken. The court reasoned that since the Virginia un-
insured motorist laws deal only with policies, contracts, and insurance
companies, a self-insurer is not affected by these statutes. Truly, there
is no real need to include under the uninsured motorist statute one who
has qualified under Virginia law as a self-insurer, for such a person
is deemed possessed of the financial ability to respond satisfactorily to
judgments arising from the operation of his automobile; however, it is
possible, as the instant case shows, that the employees of a self-insurer
may suffer because they cannot collect their judgment from an uninsured
motorist who is without funds.r'
47. Id. 203 Va. at 520.
48. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 §§ 38.1-381 (c) (iv) (Supp. 1964).
49. Yellow Cab Co. of Virginia, Inc. v. Adinolfi, 204 Va. 815, 134 S.E.2d 309 (1964).
50. Ibid.
51. Also not included within the definition of "uninsured automobiles", and usually
expressly excepted from coverage in uninsured motorist endorsements, are the following:
motor vehicles owned by the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Virginia,
a political subdivision thereof, or an agency of either; vehicles operated on rails; vehicles
while located for use as residences and not as vehicles, such as house trailers used as
residences; and vehicles or pieces of equipment designed for use principally off public
roads, such as farm tractors, except while actually on the public highway. See Fargrave
& Forney, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 665, 667 (1964).
In addition, there are also several exclusions to be found in the usual uninsured motorist
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JOHN DOE AcrioNs
In Virginia, when the driver of the vehicle responsible for causing
injury or property damage is unknown, the injured party may institute
suit against the unknown defendant as "John Doe" 2 This fictitious
person, John Doe, is created by the statute to substitute for the absent
unknown motorist. In such action, the injured plaintiff is required to
serve process upon his insurance company "... . as though such insurance
company were a party defendant; such company shall thereafter have
the right to file pleadings and take other action allowable by law in the
name of the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle or in its
own name...." 53
Despite the fact that the insurance company defends the action
endorsement. For example, the policy does not apply to injuries received by the insured
while occupying an automobile (other than the insured vehicle) owned by the named
insured, or his spouse if a resident of the same household. Neither does the coverage
apply if the insured is struck by such a car. To illustrate, if 2a man has uninsured
motorist coverage and his wife owns an uninsured vehicle, he cannot recover for
injuries received while riding with his wife nor can he recover 'for injury sustained
through being struck by her car. Ibid.
Further excluded from coverage, if the company so desires, is the first two hundred
dollars of the total amount of property damage resulting from an automobile accident.
VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381 (b) (Supp. 1964).
52. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(e) (Supp. 1964).
53. Ibid.
In John Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962), the insurance company
defended on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional because the provision for
substituted service denied John Doe due process of law. Finding to the contrary, the
court stated [203 Va. at 513]: "The defendant John Doe is a fictitious person created
under the provisions of the statute to stand in the place of the unknown motorist. John
Doe is not a person, but for the purpose of this proceeding speaks through the insurance
company. The insurance company, which is the party ultimately liable under the
provisions of its policy for a judgment obtained against John Doe . . . speaks and
defends the action through and in the name of John Doe. Since John Doe is afforded
the opportunity to defend the action through the insurance company, he has not been
denied due process of law.
Similarly, in John Doe v. Faulkner, 203 Va. 522, 125 S.E.2d 169 (1962), the court
struck down the insurance company's argument that since plaintiff's testimony was un-
corroborated and since John Doe was "incapable" of testifying under Code section
8-286, plaintiff was precluded from obtaining judgment. To quote the court: "The
operator of the 'John Doe automobile' is unavailable because his identity is unknown.
The word unavailable is not synonymous with the word incapable used in the statute.
A witness or party to a proceeding may be unavailable for various reasons, but he is
not incapable merely because he is unavailable. Section 8-286 was adopted to provide
protection for estates of persons laboring under a disability, or who are incapable of
testifying. John Doe is not a person laboring under a disability or incapable of testifying.
Hence the statute has no application in this crime." [203 Va. at 525].
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as though it were a party defendant, the primary function of the John
Doe action is to establish the tort liability of the unknown motorist and
to establish the liquidated damages.14 The liability of the insurance
company under its uninsured motorist endorsement is not an issue in the
John Doe action. 5 Any defenses relied on by the company must there-
fore relate to the tort and not to the endorsement since the latter is of
a contractual nature. The judgment is rendered against John Doe and
not against the insurance company. In order to collect under the unin-
sured motorist coverage, the plaintiff, once he obtains a judgment against
John Doe, institutes a separate suit against the insurance company. In
such action ex contractu, policy defenses may then be properly raised
by the company."6
Whenever the driver of the automobile causing the injury or damage
is unknown, the Virginia statute requires ". . . the insured or some-
one on his behalf, in order to recover under the [uninsured motorist]
endorsement, [to] . .. report the accident as required by § 46.1-400,
unless such insured is reasonably unable to do so, in which event the
insured shall make such report as soon as reasonably practicable .... ,
And Code section 46.1-400 provides that "the driver of a vehicle in-
volved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or
total property damage to an apparent extent of fifty dollars, or more,
shall, within five days after the accident, make a written report of it
to the Division [of Motor Vehicles]. . . ." 58 If the uninsured motorist
54. See Court, Virginia's Experience with the Uninsured Motorist Act, 3 W. & M. L.
REv. 237 (1962).
55. Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140, 129 S.E.2d 829 (1963).
"Causes of action in tort cannot be joined with causes of action in contract ac-
cording to the classic rule which has been followed in Virginia for some years." PHELIPS,
HANDBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE IN AcTIoNs AT LAw 142 (1959).
56. Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
57. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(d) (Supp. 1964).
58. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 46.1-400 (REPL. VOL. 1958).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Supp. 1964), somewhat more stringent and detailed than
the comparable Virginia statute, provides that there shall be no recovery under the un-
insured motorist endorsement unless "(1) the insured or someone in his behalf shall
have reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time,
under all the circumstances, after its occurrence and unless (2) the injury was caused by
physical contact with the unknown vehicle, and (3) the insured was not negligent in
failing to determine the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other vehicle
at the time of the accident." With this latter provision compare the much more liberal
rule expressed in Mangus v. John Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962). Also, Vir-
ginia does not require, as a prerequisite to recovery under the endorsement, that there
be physical contact between the automobiles.
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is known, however, there is no requirement under the uninsured motor-
ist statute that such notice must be given the Division.
Recognized as a prerequisite to recovery against the insurance carrier,
this requirement of notice has further emphasized the distinction made
between the ex delicto John Doe action and the resulting ex contractu
action against the insurer. In the former action, ". . the giving of
notice of the accident is not [necessary] .. ., for the action arises in tort
and the only issue is the liability of the unknown party-" 59 In the
Brown case,' ° which was a John Doe action, the court commented on
this subject as follows:
This is not an action arising ex contractu to recover against the in-
surance company on its endorsement. The insurance company is not
a named party defendant and judgment cannot be entered against it in
this action. This is an action ex delicto, since the cause of action arises
out of a tort, and the only issues presented are the establishment of
legal liability on the unknown uninsured motorist, John Doe, and the
fixing of damages, if any. This conclusion is strengthened by the lan-
guage used in § 38.1-381(g) which reads: '... nor may anything be
required of the insured [plaintiff] except the establishment of legal
liability... .' Hence an allegation in the motion for judgment that
notice of the accident had been given to the Division of Motor Ve-
hicles, or that plaintiff was reasonably unable to do so, was not a pre-
requisite to maintaining this action against John Doe.61
On the other hand, in an ex contractu action against the insurance
company to collect the damages awarded against the uninsured motor-
ist, the provision in the statute requiring that notice be given the Division
of Motor Vehicles establishes a condition precedent to recovery. The
effect on the insured's right to recover when another person fies the
accident report was the principal issue in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sours.6 The plaintiff, injured while driving a borrowed car, obtained a
John Doe judgment in a suit defended by the insurance carrier. Then,
in an action against the insurance company proper to enforce the judg-
ment, the defense was made that the plaintiff had failed to make the
required report. It appeared that a report was filed by the owner of
the car plaintiff was driving, but not expressly for plaintiff's benefit.
59. John Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 511, 125 S.E.2d 159 (1962).
60. Ibid.
61. Id. 203 Va. at 515; accord, Hodgson v. John Doe, 203 Va. 938, 128 S.E.2d 444
(1962).
62. 205 Va. 602, 139 S.E.2d 51 (1964).
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The court, in holding that such report satisfied the statute and enabled
plaintiff to recover, noted that ".... the report indicated that the plain-
tiff had been seriously injured in the accident, and to that extent was for
her benefit. The filing of a duplicate report by the plaintiff would have
served no useful purpose." 63
PROCEDURAL NICETIES
As in a proceeding against John Doe, an insured plaintiff instituting
a suit against a known uninsured motorist also must serve process upon
the insurance company as though such carrier were a party defendant.
"[S]uch company shall thereafter have the right to file pleadings and
take other action allowable by law in the name of the [known uninsured
motorist] . . . or in its own name, provided, however, that nothing
... shall prevent such [uninsured motorist] ... from employing counsel
of his own choice and taking any action in his own interest." 14 Thus,
before the insurance company may be held liable, the statute commands
that process must be served on the insurance carrier even in the ex
delicto action against the uninsured motorist."
The necessity of compliance with the above statute was well illus-
trated by the situation presented in Createau v. Phoenix Assur. Co. 66 The
injured plaintiff instituted suit against the negligent uninsured motorist,
then, in the instant action, sought to recover from the insurance carrier
under the terms of its uninsured motorist endorsement. The court found
for the insurance company, holding that plaintiff's failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements of §§ 38.1-381(e)(1) in the first action
was fatal to her case in the second. Nor had the insurance company
waived its statutory rights when it received actual notice of the time
and place of the first action and had sent an observer to the trial.
The court approved the doctrine that "the presence of an unserved
defendant, though accompanied by an attorney, merely as a spectator,
when the case is called, is not a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, unless in some way he participates in the proceedings therein." 67
63. Id. 205 Va. at 606.
64. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 §§ 38.1-381(e) (1).
65. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 203 Va. 446, 125 S.E.2d 154 (1964),
it was held that this statutory provision was as much a part of the insurance contract
as if expressly written therein.
66. 202 Va. 641, 119 S.E.2d 336 (1961).
67. Id. 202 Va. at 644, quoting Crockett v. Reynolds, 76 W.Va. 763, 766, 86 S.E. 887
(1915).
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The above decision, while unfortunate in its end result, does not
derogate from the liberal intent and aims of the uninsured motorist laws.
It is necessary to have procedural safeguards; and, although in this par-
ticular situation they worked to the advantage of the carrier, in other
instances these safeguards are just as advantageous for the injured party,
or even for the uninsured motorist. For instance, it has been determined
that ex delicto actions are not removable from the state court to a fed-
eral district court on a petition filed only by the insurance company
alone and not in behalf of, or accompanied by a like petition of, the
uninsured motorist.68 "Assuming arguendo that the insurance carrier
is a defendant within the meaning of the Virginia Uninsured Motorist
statute..., and assuming also that said insurance carrier is a defendant
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 . . .".6 the cause of action
against the insurance company is neither separate nor independent from
that against the uninsured motorist. Therefore, there can be no removal
by the insurance company in the absence of a like petition by the un-
insured motorist. There is, however, "... every indication that the
insurance company ... [may file] a petition for removal in the name
of the defendant [uninsured motorist]." 70
In Ivory v. Nichols,71 the inquiry was whether or not an insurance
company which had.filed pleadings and taken other action in its own
name in the ex delicto action was an "adverse party" to whom inter-
rogatories could be directed pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Answering emphatically that interrogatories could
be so directed, the court reasoned that "to hold otherwise would fore-
close the right of the insurance company-filing pleadings and taking
other action allowable by law in its own name-to resort to many of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 72 The court recognized that
while ".... action by an insurance company in filing pleadings [in the
ex delicto action] . . . does not, in itself, subject the insurance carrier
to the payment of a judgment rendered against the [uninsured motor-
ist] ... it would appear that [the carrier] . . . by answering the com-
plaint comes within the framework of Rule 33 and is an 'adverse
party'."
Venue presents a procedural problem under the Virginia uninsured
68. Orlikowski v. Mearns, 212 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Va. 1962).
69. Id. 212 F. Stpp. at 38.
70. Ibid.
71. 34 F.R.D. 128 (E.D. Va. 1963).
72. ld. at 129.
73. Ibid.
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motorist laws, for there are no statutory provisions relating to the
proper venue for an action against an unknown motorist. When the
uninsured motorist is identified, the action is brought in the county
wherein the defendant motorist resides; however, if the motorist is un-
known, then obviously venue cannot be based upon his residence. This
problem has led to a dispute between theorists and essayists on the
one hand, and the Virginia courts on the other. The former contend
that since the insurance company is not technically a party defendant,
venue cannot be fixed by the carrier's residence; therefore, the venue
may only be laid where the cause of action arose.74 Hence, under this
view, if a Virginian having uninsured motorist coverage, was involved
in an accident in Tennessee with an unknown motorist, then the laws
of the forum (Tennessee) where the mishap occurred would control
the tort action. 7' Then, the Virginian would institute an action in Vir-
ginia against his insurance carrier for collection of the judgment. 76
The foregoing view is not the law in Virginia today. Indeed, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has emphatically stated that while the
insurance company is not "technically" a party defendant, it is consid-
ered a defendant for all practical purposes, including that of determining
venue of the ex delicto action against John Doe.
Since John Doe is a fictitious person and has no place of abode apart
from the insurance company, and since notice of the action must be
served on the insurance company which defends the action in the name
of John Doe, it may reasonably be concluded, for the purpose of venue,
that the action may be treated as being against the real defendant, the
insurance company, and thus permit the plaintiff to have the protection
for which he has paid .... [T]herefore .... the venue for the John
Doe action, which is not specifically fixed by the uninsured motorist
law, is to be determined under the general venue statutes as if the ac-
tion against John Doe were against the insurance company itself.77
THE INSURANCE COMPANY AS "GUARANTOR"
When the injured insured obtains judgment against an unknown
motorist and collects the amount of the judgment, or any part of it,
74. See, e.g., Richardson & Doar, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law, 15
S.C.L.Q. 739, 746 (1963); Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 145, 163 (1961).
75. See dissenting opinion of Whittle, J., in Hodgson v. John Doe, 203 Va. 938, 944,
128 S.E.2d 444 (1962).
76. See Richardson & Doar, supra note 74, at 746.
77. Hodgson v. John Doe, 203 Va. 938, 943, 128 S.E.2d 444 (1962); see PHELS,
HANDBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW (Supp. 1964
at 95).
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from his insurance company under its policy of uninsured motorist
coverage, the insurance carrier is then subrogated to the insured's rights
against the uninsured motorist to the extent of the payment.", This
simply means that the carrier is substituted in place of, and succeeds
to the rights of, the injured insured in relation to the latter's claims
against the uninsured motorist. But what happens in the John Doe
situation when, after the claim has been paid by the insurance com-
pany, the identity of the negligent motorist becomes known? The
Virginia statute provides a specific answer: the former John Doe suit
is held to be no bar to the bringing of a new action by the insured
against the now identified tortfeasor, provided, however, that any re-
covery be paid over to the insurance company to the extent the carrier
previously paid the insured.79 The insurance company, nevertheless, is
required to pay its proportionate part of the costs and expenses incurred
in this subsequent suit, including reasonable attorney's fees. 0
The total effect of the above provision, combined with the other
sections of the Virginia uninsured motorist law, is to place the insur-
ance carrier in the position of guarantor, thereby making certain that
the injured insured is guaranteed payment of his claims against the un-
insured or unknown motorist.8' In addition, "subparagraph (g) pre-
vents the 'fine print' of the contract of insurance from defeating the
intent of the law. .." 82 by stating "nor may anything be required of
the insured except the establishment of legal liability." s3 The admitted
purpose of such statutory language, above all else, is to insure adequate
protection for the injured."4
78. VA. CoD ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(f) (Supp. 1964).
79. Ibid.
Subrogation rights under § 38.1-381(h) (Supp. 1964), which deals with the problems
caused when both the uninsured motorist law and the workmen's compensation laws
cover the same accident, are dealt with in Horne v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282,
123 S.E.2d 401 (1962).
80. Ibid.
81. Accord, Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 SE.2d 841 (1964).
82. Court, Virginia's Experience with the "Uninsured Motorist Act', 3 W. & M. L.
REv. 237 (1962).
83. VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1964).
84. Virginia has also eliminated the two-step process of trial and arbitration by
specifically providing that no policy shall contain any provision requiring arbitration
of any claim arising under the uninsured motorist provisions. VA. CODE ANN. 1950
§ 38 .1-381(g) (Supp. 1964); see Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement; 1965 INs. L. J. 17, 20; Note, The Uninsured Motorist: A Look at the Various
Statutes, 15 W. Rrs. L. REv. 386 (1964).
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ELIMINATION OF THE "OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSE":
THE BRYANT DECISION
Previous to 1965, it was common practice to insert in the usual un-
insured motorist policy a clause which stated that the instant coverage
would apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance
available to the insured and only in the amount by which the limits
of this coverage exceeded the limits of liability of the other insurance.
To illustrate the effect of such a provision, let us assume that the insured
is riding as a guest in an automobile, not owned by him, which is covered
by an uninsured motorist policy. He is covered by the policy on the
car which belongs to his host; he is also covered by his own policy, but
only to the extent that his own policy limits exceed the limits of his
host's policy. Thus, if his host has the usual $15,000-$30,000-$5,000
limits and the insured also has these $15,000-$30,000-$5,000 limits, his
own policy provides no coverage whatsoever, that is, if the "other in-
surance" clause is valid. 5
In a somewhat more complicated factual situation than that above,
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells8 held that the "other insurance" clause
was completely valid under Virginia law. There, the limits of the
host's policy were identical to the limits under the insured's policy;
however, since the $30,000 limit of the host's policy was exhausted by
being paid to other injured parties, the guest could not collect. The
court decided that the guest was not covered under his own policy
because of the "other insurance" clause, in spite of the fact that the
"other insurance" was for practical purposes unavailable to the guest.
The court held that the Virginia uninsured motorist law "did not pro-
pose to provide an injured guest with protection beyond the statutory
limits through a combination of the host's insurance and that owned
by the guest for himself." 87
Both the reasoning and the result reached in the Wells case are vul-
nerable to criticism. Disregarding, for the moment, the obvious crit-
icism based on the intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist statute,
there is no real reason, statutory or logical, for completely depriving
the injured party of any recovery. Both the injustice of the result and
the fallacy of the court's reasoning, led to much criticism.
85. See Fargrave & Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 31 INs. COUNSEL J. 665,
669 (1964).
86. 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963), reversing 209 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Va. 1962).
87. Id. at 773.
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While there may be sound reason for preventing an insured under
... [uninsured motorist] coverage from recovering more than the
policy limits under his own policy . . ., there seems little reason for
wording the 'other insurance' clause so as to deprive .. . [the guest]
of any recovery at all irrespective of whether he participated in the
proceeds of the other policy.... It ... [can] be argued that a clause
of that sort involves taking away with the left hand what the right
hand has promised earlier in the policy where the company promises
to pay claims arising when the insured is injured while riding as a
passenger in another automobile.88
In Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.," the breakthrough was
achieved when the highest court of Virginia reached a result directly
contrary to the Wells case. The Bryant decision held that "other in-
srance clauses," being in conflict with the Virginia uninsured motorist
law, were invalid. After reviewing the principal uninsured motorist
decisions in Virginia, the court made the following observations:
[The] cases all established that the controlling instrument is the
statute and that provisions in the insurance policy that conflict with the
requirements of the statute, either by adding to or taking from its re-
quirements, are void and ineffectiveY0
Section 38.1-381(b) of the Code... commands that no policy of
bodily injury liability insurance shall be issued or delivered unless it
undertakes to pay the insured 'all sums' he is legally entitled to recover
as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
within the limits of the policy. That is plain language. It means that
every such policy shall so provide .... The limit of the recovery of
the plaintiff under any or all insurance policies carrying the uninsured
motorist provision required by § 38.1-381(b) would be the amount
of the insured's judgment against the uninsured motorist.91
The rule laid down in the Bryant decision has now been approved by
the federal courts. On June 4, 1965, the federal court for the Eastern
District of Virginia decided Pulley v. Allstate Ins. Co.,92 wherein it was
noted that "the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is the final word
88. 7 APPL.mAN, INsuamNcm LAW & PAcricE 27-28 (Supp. 1965).
89. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
90. Id. 205 Va. at 900.
91. Id. 205 Va. at 901.
92. 242 F. Supp. 330 (ED. Va. 1965).
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on the interpretation of any state statute which raises no federal
question.... [The] Wells case is no longer the law." 93
CONCLUSION
If it be conceded that the purpose of the Virginia uninsured motorist
legislation is to provide protection for the insured person against in-
jury and damage caused him by the negligence of an uninsured or un-
known motorist, then it can scarcely be denied that the statute, as ex-
plained and applied in court decisions, has succeeded handily in achiev-
ing that purpose. There are still, of course, problems to be worked out
as is the case with nearly all new legislation. The amazing thing is
that there are so few problems in such a revolutionary (for Virginia)
enactment. The statute has successfully gone into detail to assure the
injured party of complete justice and, at the same time, has preserved
the basic rights of the insurance company, the uninsured driver, and
third parties, while putting no additional burdens upon the state. The
principles utilized in the uninsured motorist law, basically social and
humanitarian in intent and purpose, have taken hold and flourished
quite surprisingly well in the fundamentally conservative soil of Virginia.
The commendable development of these principles in our Common-
wealth bodes well for the future, for the rising problems of tomorrow's
complicated society cannot be conquered by methods which served
so well in the past but are fast becoming useless; they can only be
met with weapons forged from ideas as new as the problems they are
called upon to face.
James L. Tucker
93. ld. at 335.
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